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The paper investigates whether positive network eects may have ex-
isted between large-scale commercial farmers and small-scale communal
farmers prior to the recent land redistribution in Zimbabwe. A dierence-
in-dierence approach is used where measurement is carried out using
several data sources including farm level, geographic and survey infor-
mation for cotton farmers in Mashonaland Central. It tests whether the
removal of large-scale farmers has resulted in a decline in productivity
for those small-scale farmers close to redistributed land as compared to
those located at greater distances from large-scale/commercial farms. A
signicant negative productivity eect is found in addition to a country-
wide negative redistribution eect. The latter is most likely due to wider
economic and political instability over the last 10 years.
Keywords: Land redistribution, network eects, cotton farming,
agricultural productivity, Zimbabwe JEL Codes: Q12, Q15, O17, O33,
N57
1 Introduction
Implementing land reform programmes has been an important element of post-
independence government policy in many developing countries. Successful re-
distribution can address societal inequalities as well as economic ineciencies
inherent in pre-reform systems (Deininger et al. 2000). Redistribution can also
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1however, be disruptive to important processes in the agricultural sector and the
wider economy (Horowitz 1993). The potential success of land redistribution
policies may be especially vulnerable if the structure of the existing system is
not well understood and particularly dichotomous, potentially leading to the
dismantling of both positive and negative characteristics of the old system. By
making use of a natural experiment in Zimbabwe, this paper analyses how net-
work eects may be compromised to the detriment of agricultural productivity
when land redistribution polices do not acknowledge the importance of informal
and localised agricultural support structures and social learning processes.
The signicance of agricultural support structures for productivity gains in
developing countries is well understood (Deininger et al. 2009, Kinsey 2004).
Similarly, there is a large emerging literature on the importance of social learn-
ing in encouraging technology diusion and growth processes (Bandiera and
Rasul 2006, Conley and Udry 2010). Land reform outcomes have also received
much attention, across a range of countries and policy structures (Binswanger et
al. 1995). This paper aims to contribute to these three areas of the literature by
investigating network eects and land redistribution in Zimbabwe's recent Fast
Track Land Reform (FTLR) programme, started in 2000. Important positive
spillover eects are found to exist between farmer groups in Zimbabwe. These
may facilitate social learning and contribute to other agricultural productivity
drivers. The paper tests whether recent land redistribution policies in Zimbabwe
have compromised these positive spillovers by removing from agricultural com-
munities a large part of the farmer group generating the spillovers. Further, the
paper shows that the breakdown in these spillover eects may explain part of
the redistribution policy's poor performance to date.
The country's recent FTLR was designed to reallocate under-utilised agri-
cultural land to small-holder farmers located on over-utilised, low-quality agri-
cultural land. The Zimbabwean agricultural sector is comprised of two main
farming groups. Large-scale commercial farmers, the target of the recent reset-
tlement policy, have by and large exited the agricultural sector since 2000. On
the other hand, small-scale communal farmers, the intended beneciaries of the
policy, have received little benet from the programme, as relatively few house-
holds have been permanently resettled to date (Dore et al. 2008). Both pre-
2and post-redistribution, these groups of farmers operated in rural, often remote
areas of the country with limited access to infrastructure including transport
links, access to markets and agricultural extension services.
The paper's motivation comes partly from anecdotal evidence suggesting
that commercial farmers oer informal and localised access to inputs and ex-
tension services to communal farmers. Second, a commercial farming sub-group
was not directly targeted by the land reform which allows identication in this
paper. And nally, the land redistribution policy has not achieved the success
government anticipated at the implementation of the policy in 2000.1
Using a dierence-in-dierence approach the paper investigates, at farm
level, the eect of distance from commercial farms on the agricultural pro-
ductivity of communal cotton farmers. Identication of the distance eect is
carried out using an artefact of the land redistribution policy as follows. I
exploit the fact that the FTLR was largely driven by the desire to correct
historical racial inequalities with regard to land holdings. Thus, `indigenous'
farmers with large commercial farming enterprises prior to the reform were not
targeted by the FTLR policy. Utete (2003, p.46) notes explicitly: \Reasons for
de-listing farms were that some of the farms were indigenous[ly] owned...". On
the other hand, `non-indigenous' commercial farmers were the primary targets
of the policy (AFP 2010).2 This de facto policy of non-targeted (indigenous)
and targeted (non-indigenous) commercial farmers provides the natural exper-
iment with which the distance eect of interest can be identied. As with any
natural experiment perfect randomisation may not be achieved in practice but
minor dierences between commercial farmer groups are controlled for here.
The estimation strategy then compares communal farmers' productivity
both as a function of distance from commercial farms and proximity to in-
digenous or non-indigenous commercial farmer groups. Here distance is the
treatment whilst redistribution, through use of the natural experiment as de-
scribed, provides the necessary identication. Implementation of this strategy
is achieved by using high quality agricultural production data and farm/er-level
1For example, national agricultural output has, on average, declined. A government com-
missioned report (Utete 2003) explains this as (partly) due to low access to inputs and exten-
sion services in the agricultural sector coinciding with the onset of the resettlement programme.
2The dierentiation of farmers into indigenous and non-indigenous groups is contentious.
Here I use the government of Zimbabwe's categorisation of indigenous to mean black and
non-indigenous to mean white (or non-black) large-scale farmers (Utete 2003, p.12;27).
3controls.
The richness of the available data allows several robustness tests to be carried
out which examine the validity of the paper's design. This is possible by utilis-
ing pre- and post-redistribution data (available for alternate outcome variables)
explicitly. Further, several mechanisms are investigated through which the dis-
tance (or network) eects of interest within agrarian communities may operate
and examine potential selection bias between indigenous and non-indigenous
commercial farmers.
Measurement of the eect of distance is carried out using agricultural in-
put and output data at farm level as well as farmer characteristics, survey and
farmer training data for 22,766 cotton farmers in a fertile, northern province
of the country which is located spatially. The identication strategy is facili-
tated by using data on the current and pre-resettlement ownership structure of
agricultural land in the province.3
Spatial location of the data allows further enrichment of the dataset with
geographic, climactic and location-specic, institutional cotton-market informa-
tion. This enables several robustness tests to be carried out as follows.
Survey data, available from both pre- and post-redistribution, oers alter-
nate outcome variables that can be matched to the farm level, using geographic
location information. Results on survey-outcomes that conrm the presence of
the distance eect of interest before redistribution will provide support for the
paper's identication strategy.
Productivity eects of a Non-Governmental Organisation (NGO)-led train-
ing programme for small-scale communal cotton farmers is also examined. This
exercise also makes use of both pre- and post-redistribution data. This exercise
tests the validity of the primary estimation strategy as well as investigating a
specic mechanism through which the network eects of interest may operate,
namely social learning.
Nearest-neighbour matching techniques are used to examine the robustness
of the primary estimation results by controlling for observables non-linearly.
Detailed records for a sub-group (`detailed sub-group') of the farm-level sam-
3While most non-indigenous commercial farmers were subject to the FTLR, a small number
of these farmers remain on their land. These farms and the communal farmers close to this
land have been excluded from the empirical analysis.
4ple is investigated in order to examine the eects of observed links between
cotton farmers. This tests whether access to timely transportation of inputs is
important for farmer productivity.
Selection bias between land farmed by indigenous and non-indigenous com-
mercial farmers is investigated and controlled for by testing the similarity of
geographic conditions facing both farmer groups.
Finally, the indigenous farmer-group is augmented with high-quality, small-
scale, communal farmers. This allows examination of the importance of land
ownership structures over farmer-quality on the network eects of interest.
Should the network eects of interest survive, it would mean that land own-
ership structures are not important for the network eects of interest implying
that these eects are instead contingent on farmer-quality.
The results show signicant negative eects for communal cotton farmer pro-
ductivity on removal of proximate, non-indigenous commercial farmers. This is
in addition to the country-wide negative productivity eect of land redistribu-
tion (due to wider economic and political instability in the country over the last
10 years). The results provide evidence rst that network eects exist and are
important to the structure of the agricultural sector and second that the negative
productivity eect of interest is a result of the breakdown in localised positive
externalities that operated between those commercial farmers whose farms have
been redistributed under the policy and surrounding communal farmers.
Section 2 examines literature on network eects, agricultural productivity,
land reform processes and cotton farming in Zimbabwe. Section 3 describes the
recent land resettlement policy as well as characteristics of the cotton sector in
Zimbabwe. The dierence-in-dierence design, data, analytic specication and
several robustness tests are described in Section 4 while Section 5 reports the
paper's results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature
This paper adds to the emerging literature on the importance of social learning
in encouraging technology diusion and growth processes. This is exemplied
by Bandiera and Rasul (2006), who examine the adoption of a new crop in
5Mozambique and test the theory of economies of scale in commercialisation and
Conley and Udry (2010), who systematically investigate social learning in rela-
tion to networks and communication channels in the context of new technology
adoption in Ghana. In the case of cotton farming in northern Zimbabwe, the
current paper shows that social learning contributes to sustainable technology
diusion within the wider cotton-growing community. My paper also adds to
the empirical work on treatment eects. Seminal work by Miguel and Kremer
(2004) measures health intervention impacts, the current paper investigates the
impact of land reform on agricultural network eects.
Cotton market systems in Africa have recently attracted attention in the
form of a comprehensive review by the World Bank (Poulton et al. 2004),
which examines the liberalisation experiences of Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe compares favourably to other coun-
tries.4 For example, Cottco's5 credit-input scheme is described as `unrivalled
within liberalised cash crop systems in Africa in terms of coverage and repay-
ment record' (Poulton et al. 2004, p.526).6 This credit-input scheme provides
some of the data used in this paper.
Technical papers highlight the requirement for adequate training of farmers
in order to ensure yield potentials are achieved, for example Matthews (1999)
on the importance of pest control in cotton. Robustness checks in Section
5 conrm the existence of positive spillovers within communities containing
trained-farmers in the context of cotton farming. While Govereh and Jayne
(1999) look at the eects of cash crop production on food crop productivity in
Zimbabwe and nd signicant synergies. This informs the `insurance crop' role
that cotton plays in the country, reducing the crop's price elasticity of supply,
which is important to the empirical work here. For example, farmers grow the
crop each year as access to chemical and other inputs for cash-crops facilitate
simultaneous productivity gains in cash and food crops where state support for
the latter has diminished. This is important for identication in the current
4Larsen (2002) describes the successful privatisation of the cotton marketing sector in Zim-
babwe, whilst Imani-Development (2003) examines the role of cotton in the broader economy.
5Originally the state owned monopoly cotton marketing board, Cottco was successfully
privatised in the early 1990s. Although there are now over 20 cotton marketing companies in
the country, Cottco retains over 50% of the national market and operates a vital credit-input
scheme for its growers.
6See Appendix A for further detail.
6paper, for example, cotton's insurance role insulates it from large movements in
real prices during the country's hyperin
ation.
Land reform polices have received considerable attention in the literature,
for example the importance of appropriate support structures widely (Deininger
et al. 2009) and in Zimbabwe (Kinsey 2004), as well as land reform outcomes
in general (Binswanger et al. 1995). Of particular importance to the current
paper is the work by Conning and Robinson (2007) who utilise Indian data
and a theoretical framework to illustrate the joint determination of economic
and political institutions aecting agricultural organisation and property rights.
They conclude that land reform, property rights and the political organisation
of agriculture are key to the wider eects of land reform programmes. Further,
they underscore the importance of understanding the economic organisation of
agriculture pre-reform and subsequently shaping land reform to be consistent
with these institutional conditions, even at the detriment of economic eciency.
Zimbabwean land reforms carried out in the 1980s have received signicant
attention in the literature. There is less work on the recent reforms, in part
due to the diculty in accessing reliable data within the agricultural sector,
though Scoons et al. (2010) is an important contribution here, representing one
of the few available studies on the recent redistribution. This work carries out
in-depth eld-based analysis of Zimbabwe's recent land redistribution process
in one area of the country. The ndings show wide heterogeneity in the ef-
fects of the land redistribution, as experienced by resettled farmers and the
wider agricultural community. Especially striking are the positive productivity,
asset accumulation, land investment and livelihood adaptation experiences doc-
umented by the authors. Although not statistically representative, this study's
conclusions provide signicant motivation for wider spread, focussed studies on
land redistribution and its eects throughout Zimbabwe. The book's conclu-
sions highlight the potential present within the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe
that may allow positive and wide-spread recovery of the sector in time.7
Work on the earlier reforms include Deininger et al. (2000) on the contribu-
tion of land reform to positive growth, Deininger et al. (2004) on the costs and
benets of early reforms, Robilliard et al. (2002) on their eectiveness as re-
7Further detail relating to ocial publications describing the country's land reform process
can be found in Appendix B.
7gards poverty reduction and Owens et al. (2003) on the importance of extension
services for successful agricultural outcomes. Finally, Kinsey (2004) nds that
although resettled villages in earlier reforms have achieved positive outcomes,
successful agricultural development is predicated on access to appropriate in-
puts.8
Further, several papers investigate the impacts of the earlier reforms on
civil society (Barr 2004, Barr et al. 2010b,a) including civil society engagement,
trust and social enforcement and community-level organisational membership.
Whilst more generally Bird and Shepherd (2003) examines the persistence of
rural poverty in semi-arid Zimbabwe, nding important roles for remoteness,
geographical conditions, and social and political exclusion. This informs the
empirical work carried out here, especially taking geographic and climactic farm
characteristics into account.
This paper aims to make a further contribution here, both in its focus on
the recent reform and on non-beneciaries within a large redistributive process.
Although disruption to agricultural production is expected in the rst years of
reform, long-run estimates suggest sustainable livelihoods for beneciaries. I
examine agricultural outcomes some years after the onset of the redistribution
of interest, and focus exclusively on non-beneciaries. This is of interest as
the recent redistribution was expected to both boost the outcomes of direct
beneciaries, but also to have wider eects in non-beneciary communities as
land pressure was relieved.
3 Context
Zimbabwe is a medium-sized,9 low-income country in sub-Saharan Africa (see
Figure 1). The World Bank estimates purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted
income at US$170 per capita. The country's debt to GDP ratio is currently
over 300% and although growth has been positive in 2010 the previous decade
was characterised by contraction. Ocial development assistance accounts for
8These were provided generously by government agencies to resettlement programmes ini-
tiated in the 1980s.
9The population stands at between eight and nine million inhabitants.
811% of gross national income (GNI).10
Figure 1: Mashonaland Central, Zimbabwe
Sources: Diva, 2010 and ArcGIS.
Land redistribution has been an ongoing policy instrument for authorities
in the country since colonisation over 100 years ago. Post-independence policies
have been designed to address the inequalities resulting from pre-independence
redistributions. In contrast to the 1980s reforms, which although limited were
largely successful (Deininger et al. 2002), Zimbabwe's FTLR policy, imple-
mented in 2000 on the back of wider economic and political concerns, remains
ongoing and has been marred by violence as well as extra-judicial, chaotic and
patchy implementation.11 In the empirical work I proxy for violence using, prox-
imity to roads. Many of the intended beneciaries have not yet been allocated
secure areas of land to farm (Utete 2003), whilst national agricultural output
10Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), gures are for 2005, the last year that
reliable gures were available. Further background information available in Appendix A1.
11For example, Dore et al. (2008) note that the FTLF policy, as described by the government
in `People First', resulted in a process that was at best complex and at worst extra-judicial,
where actions were taken by district ocials who proceeded to allocated land despite lacking
ocial authority to do so. These opportunistic and chaotic allocations, often accompanied
by violence, may in part have been correlated with access (at least initially) to farms close
to urban centres and/or major roads. For example, Utete (2003, p.31) notes: \...problems
were compounded by the activities of certain persons who, though lacking any ocial status
or authority, nonetheless proceeded to allocate land, mainly in districts adjacent to the main
towns and cities: the rural districts close to Harare, Bulawayo, Masvingo and Gwanda being
perhaps the most aected."
9has declined for most major crops (bar tea) since the onset of the redistribution
policy (see Figure 2). State commissioned reports, such as Utete (2003), outline
some of the primary challenges facing the FTLR, for example, reduced access
to inputs, lack of appropriate infrastructure provision and tenure insecurity.
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Agriculture in Zimbabwe is characterised by two groups of farmers. Large-
scale commercial farmers (indigenous and non-indigenous) hold title to large
areas of land and are, in general, highly skilled and productive. Prior to the
FTLR, commercial agriculture was the largest formal private sector employer
in the country as well as being a signicant contributor to national output and
export earnings (Dore et al. 2008). A large proportion of these farms were
redistributed as part of the FTLR policy, of the redistributed land the vast
majority had previously been owned by non-indigenous farmers.
Indigenous commercial farmers are a small but important component of
this group. They were not targeted as part of the FTLR policy due to the
policy's underlying aims i.e. to address historic, namely racial, imbalances in
10land ownership across the country.12 There is little documentation regarding
this group of farmers. However, in so far as indigenous commercial farmers
purchased13 their land on the open market and were subject to country-specic
market and environmental risks and rewards, there is no reason to believe these
farmers can be dierentiated from their non-indigenous counterparts other than
along racial lines.
Small-scale communal farmers comprise the second group of farmers. This
group farms smaller plots of land, on average 16 hectares per family (including
communal grazing land) in 1980 (Chavunduka 1982). Neither resettled nor
non-resettled farmers in this group hold the title to their land. Communal
land is state-owned with user rights conferred, according to traditional tenure
structures, to members of a local community by traditional leaders (Rukuni
1994).14 This reduces their ability to access credit essential to the development
of their farms. For example, Rukuni (1994, p. 16) notes that \...communal land
is not accepted by private credit institutions as a form of collateral security...".
Communally farmed areas have thus seen low levels of investment in immovable
compared to movable assets. This has been singled out as one of the main drivers
of low productivity gains in this sector of agriculture. Furthermore, communal
farmers are relatively unskilled, having had more limited access to higher level
education and agricultural training than their commercial counterparts.
`Treated' cotton farmers, by denition close to large-scale commercial land,
are expected to reap some benets from this proximity in the form of the land
itself being located in the areas most conducive to agricultural output in the
country. Anecdotal evidence15 suggests that commercial farmers, as part of their
local rural communities, provided proximate communal farmers with access to
services, inputs and machinery that may otherwise have been unavailable in a
12Utete (2003, p.14) specically mentions commercial land owned by `white' farmers as that
to be redistributed under the policy: \No black Government could be expected to uphold this
racially skewed land structure."
13The majority of these farmers are expected to have purchased their land since inde-
pendence, which implied the end of racial segregation laws in 1980. Signicant amounts of
non-indigenously owned land was similarly exchanged on the open market since 1980, notwith-
standing the large numbers of white-owned farms that had been held within the same family's
ownership for several generations.
14Although residents may return after an absence and reclaim land, in general there must
be some birth right to take up user rights on communal land in Zimbabwe.
15For example, Auret (2009, p.103) notes \that many commercial farmers whose land bor-
dered the Communal Areas assisted their neighbours with inputs and equipment to improve
the cropping ability of the communal farmer, with some great success."
11timely manner to communal farmers.
Since 1980, cotton farming in the country has become increasingly domi-
nated by communal farmers due to the following. First, it is a labour-intensive
crop, being hand-picked in Zimbabwe, communal farmers have a comparative
advantage here. Second, at least in the 1980s, producer prices for cotton were
kept articially low in order to support the large textile industry in the country.
This resulted in commercial farmers largely substituting away from cotton pro-
duction. Finally, the drought-resistant cotton strains used in the country mean
that income from cotton goes some way to ensuring against total maize crop
failures.
Although there are now over 25 cotton marketing companies in the country,
Cottco, the previously state-owned marketing board, provides a wide-spread
credit-input scheme for cotton farmers. According to Cottco, its credit-input
scheme achieves repayment rate of over 90%. This is in part facilitated by
detailed records on each of its farmer-client. Access to this information for 2008
and 2009 forms the primary data for this paper. Further relevant details of
the credit-input scheme include that cotton farmers are organised into groups
where credit is accessed by individual farmers and continuity of the facility is
dependent on the entire group repaying the total utilised credit at the end of each
season (Dore et al. 2008, p. 71). Cottco grants its most credit worthy farmers
\goldclass" status, conferring higher credit access and public recognition of their
productivity and timely credit repayment histories.16 Cottco also records who
collects each farmer's inputs. In most cases this is the farmer himself however
in some cases a secondary farmer or farmers may collect inputs on behalf of the
primary farmer. This detail is available for 200 farmers in the sample and traces
direct assistance-linkages between farmers.
Cottco is a majority shareholder in Quton, the country's sole seed supplier.
Communal farmers achieving high cotton yields per hectare are identied by
the companies and recruited as seed-cotton growers.
The Cotton Training Centre (CTC) provides technical training to cotton
farmers in Zimbabwe and to the region as well as agricultural extension workers
employed by the department of agriculture. Farmers are selected for training
16Cottco gathers this data annually as part of the administration and risk management of
its credit-input scheme.
12depending on their ability to read and identify pests. Participants are drawn
from several areas of the country each year. Both area and farmer selection
(conditional on ability to read) is carried out randomly. The centre's eective-
ness is designed to reach beyond the farmers that can be trained each year in
the following way. Pest reduction is important to cotton yields. Thus, trained
farmers have a strong incentive to reduce the local pest burden by passing on
their training to non-trained farmers in their communities, pest reduction at
the community level is more eective than at the farm level. The eectiveness
of the CTC's objectives is tested in the empirical results that follow.
4 Design and Identication
This section describes a dierence-in-dierence approach to test for network ef-
fects and their importance for communal farmers' agricultural productivity in
Mashonaland Central, Zimbabwe. Network eects here are described as operat-
ing at a localised level between commercial and communal farmers. They rep-
resent links between these communities whereby communal farmers access, oth-
erwise unavailable, productivity-enhancing capital (physical and human) from
commercial farmers.
The dierence-in-dierence design employed utilises location-specic infor-
mation available for commercial and communal farmers. The treatment (or rst
dierence) is measured as the geographic distance between commercial and com-
munal farmers. In this way distance (the treatment) measures the intensity of
available network eects. Those communal farmers located close to commercial
farmers are expected to be able to access these networks and their eects in a
way that those further away from commercial farmers are not. The identifying
restriction (or second dierence) is achieved by utilising an artefact of Zim-
babwe's recent FTLR. Specically, not all commercial farmers were targeted
under the policy. I argue that this selection into non-targeted (indigenous)
and targeted (non-indigenous) commercial farmers was de facto randomised, at
least on the characteristics of interest among commercial farmers, namely land
ownership structure which facilitates access to adequate capital.17 However,
17As discussed FTLR selection was however, non-randomly contingent on ethnicity.
13as with any natural experiment, perfect randomisation may not be achieved.
Here minor observed dierences between indigenous and non-indigenous com-
mercial farmers are controlled for. This natural experiment allows comparisons
between communal farmers associated18 with indigenous and non-indigenous
farmers, facilitating the paper's identication restriction.
The validity of the primary identication strategy can be tested by recourse
to the paper's rich dataset. Specically, two robustness tests make use of pre-
reform data explicitly. First, alternate (non-agricultural) outcome variables are
compared before and after the redistribution. Second information on the loca-
tion of NGO-trained cotton farmers is also available before and after redistribu-
tion. This latter test allows the analysis to be augmented in order to investigate
the eect of distance from a trained farmer, on production, before and after
redistribution. Subsequent robustness tests examine the specic mechanisms
through which these distance eects may operate.
4.1 Measurement
The measurement is carried out using several data sources for Mashonaland
Central, a fertile, cotton growing area in northern Zimbabwe. The richness of
the combined data allows the primary relationship of interest to be identied,
yields testable hypotheses regarding the validity of the identication strategy
and facilitates an investigation into the potential mechanisms through which
commercial-communal pro-productivity network eects may operate.
The dataset is built around 22,766 unique farm-level observations over the
agricultural seasons in 2008 and 2009 from Cottco.19 This data is not con-
structed as a random sample, however the number of farmers that comprise
the dataset as a proportion of all cotton farmers in Mashonaland Central20 is
expected to limit potential selection-bias at the sample selection stage. Further-
more, it is not expected that such a bias would be important for the relationships
of interest.
This farm-level data includes information on the farms themselves: number
18`Associated' here relates farmers close to and far away from commercial farmer groups.
Thus designating communal farmers to either indigenous or non-indigenous commercial farms.
19Details surrounding the sample selection are given in Appendix D.
20Approximately 59% in 2008 and 69% in 2009 of total provincial cotton-hectarage is con-
tracted to Cottco in these years.
14of hectares under cotton (`hectarage') and farm location; farming techniques:
inputs, yield and yield quality; and the farmers themselves: identication of
`seed-cotton growers', which `group' each farmer belongs to for credit repayment
purposes and whether the farmer has been classied as a `goldclass' farmer, all
measures of the quality of cotton farmers in the sample. For example, farmers
classied as goldclass farmers have been identied by Cottco as high quality
farmers over one or several parameters and are dealt with at an individual level
rather than at the group level. Similarly, seed-cotton growers are identied by
Cottco and Quton as high quality farmers and approached to grow seed-cotton
as described previously.
The farm location identier (usually available at the polling station level)
for each observation is attached to longitude and latitude coordinates using
ordinance survey maps of Mashonaland (Government of Zimbabwe 1985), as well
as online ward data from civic action group (Sokwanele, 2010). The coordinates
are used to augment the primary data with geographic and other location-
specic information.21
Several variables relating to the environmental characteristics of the region
of interest are employed in order to add depth to the farm-level data. Soil
quality data (Fischer et al. 2008) is utilised, where a soil quality composite
variable measuring the nutrient retention capacity of the soil is used. This
composite is relevant for crops requiring an intermediate level of inputs for
example, cotton. Rainfall data (Matsuura and Willmott 2009) measure total
rainfall in the area of interest for the years 2007 and 2008. There are between
1 and 3 rainfall stations per district (one administrative level above ward level)
over the area of interest. Alternate sources (Hijmans et al. 2005) provide a long-
run average annual precipitation variable, which are used for some specications.
This long-run average rainfall variable has a higher resolution than the Fischer
et al. (2008) data, resulting in more spatial variation. Data on altitude and
road networks comes from DIVA-GIS.22 A visual display of farm level data
superimposed on rainfall, altitude and soil quality data can be seen in Figure
21Geographic data are analysed using ArcGIS. All data are projected using the Universal
Transverse Mercator system before performing distance calculations and/or extraction of data
at the farm level.
22DIVA-GIS is a portal for free country-level geographic information, www.diva-
gis.org/gdata.
153, which shows that altitude and long-run rainfall display signicant variation
whilst the composite soil quality variable takes one of just three values over the
highly fertile Mashonaland Central province (the area of interest). This will
aect the ability of the soil quality measure to explain variation in productivity
amongst cotton farmers in the empirical analysis.
Figure 3: Environmental Conditions, Mashonaland Central
Source: Fischer et al. (2008), Matsuura and Willmott (2009), Hijmans et al. (2005), Cottco
(2009) & Government of Zimbabwe (1985).
The farm location identiers are also used to measure the distance of farms
from locations of interest (see Figure 5). For example, distance to the closest
road may be a proxy for relative exposure to political violence, as described
in Section 3. Distance to the closest cotton-processing plants (gins) may also
be important as this is where cotton inputs including seeds and fertilizer are
accessed as well as being the nal destination for picked, raw cotton.
Data on the number and location of farmers trained by an NGO, the CTC, is
available at the district level each year from 1990-2008 (Cotton Training Centre
2007). This is mapped, using district level location data providing information
on the relative proximity of each farm to nearby areas containing NGO-trained
farmers. This data is used to examine the robustness of the main results. These
16Figure 4: Cotton Farmer Proximity to Commercial Farm Land
Source: Farm Valuation Data, Cottco (2009) Cotton Training Centre (2009) & Government
of Zimbabwe (1985).
relationships can be seen for a subset of the sample, also in Figure 5.
Further, relative proximity of commercial farms by ownership structure is
calculated (see Figure 4). This is important for the design of the dierence-in-
dierence estimation where proximity to commercial land represents the net-
work eects (or treatment) that (treated) communal farmers are exposed to.
The current and past ownership prole of commercial land, important for the
identifying restriction (second dierence), is available from a member of the
farming community in the country working with commercial farmer compensa-
tion issues.23
The paper makes use of Central Statistics Oce (CSO) `Income, Household
and Expenditure' (ICES) survey data at the Enumeration Area (EA) level for
Mashonaland Central, collected in 1995 and 2001.24 Each EA has a location
identier at the district level and comprises between 15 and 20 households. This
23This information is currently only available for Mashonaland Central. Thus, the main
results of the paper are conned to the 22,766 cotton farmers represented in Cottco's records.
Use of the full sample during robustness testing conrms the main results based on the smaller
sample.
24Central Statistics Oce (1997, 2005).
17Figure 5: Cotton Farmer Proximity to Gins, Roads, Trained Farmers
Source: Cottco (2009), Cotton Training Centre (2009) & Government of Zimbabwe (1985).
data is mapped to the farm level data and survey outcome variables are substi-
tuted for output per hectare for a secondary dierence-in-dierence estimation.
This allows identication of the eects of the redistribution on household survey
outcome variables from before and after the redistribution explicitly. Each vari-
able measures the proportion of people with the relevant income, consumption
and expenditure outcomes for each EA.25
Finally, detailed data on cotton inputs are available for 200 farmers in the
larger sample (`detailed sub-group'). This data was made available from three
Cottco ginneries in Mashonaland Central, Bindura, Glendale and Muzarabani.
As well as documenting the quantity and price of the inputs used by each farmer
over a growing season and farm-level characteristics (hectares under cotton, lo-
cation of the farm), these records also detail how the cotton inputs were trans-
ported to each farm. Specically, whether a farmer relied on other farmers to
assist him in delivering his inputs can be traced for this subgroup.26 Figure 6
25The surveys are representative at the EA level.
26Whether farmers receive assistance is traced for all farmers, however all the assistance-
providing farmers are not present in the sub-group. Thus, the sub-group cannot not provide
a complete characterisation of all the linkages between farmers present within the group.
18shows an empty input sheet. One is allocated to each farmer in order to record
all the inputs the farmer will access from Cottco throughout the season. For
example, Figure 7 indicates the inputs received by farmer Chikwira, this farmer
signed for all of his own inputs at the ginnery. Figures 8 records the inputs
received by farmer Mazoe. Here, the farmer signs for none of his cotton inputs,
rather Chikwira signs for all these. In the dataset it is recorded that Chikwira
assists Mazoe with transportation of his inputs.
Figure 6: Cottco Credit Scheme: Inputs Sheet
Source: Cottco (2009).
The rich dataset available allows the paper's primary design to be estimated,
extensively tested and allows several mechanisms through which the network ef-
fects may operate to be uncovered in the following way. First, data on the large
sample of cotton farmers is used alongside their relative proximity to commer-
cial farms, dierentiated into indigenous and non-indigenous commercial farmer
groups to estimate the eects on productivity of treatment (distance to commer-
cial land) controlling for farmer and farm-level characteristics. Possible selection
bias between land farmed by indigenous and non-indigenous commercial farmers
is then tested and controlled for: observable selection bias on the environmental
conditions faced by each farming group is controlled for statistically.
19Figure 7: Cottco Credit Scheme: Inputs Sheet, Chikwira
Source: Cottco (2009).
Figure 8: Cottco Credit Scheme: Inputs Sheet, Mazoe
Source: Cottco (2009).
20Pre-2000 data, available for non-agricultural outcome variables, allows the
paper to make use of the time-dimension of the reform explicitly. This data
allows a comparison of survey outcomes for communal farmers before and after
the reform, as a function of their distance to commercial farms. Thus utilising
an alternate dierence-in-dierence design and testing directly for unobservable
selection bias between communal farmers associated with indigenous and non-
indigenous commercial farmers.
Examination of the NGO-led training programme data, available to commu-
nal farmers, provides further credibility to the primary identication strategy
and indicates a mechanism by which these positive network eects may oper-
ate. By utilising pre- and post- redistribution data on the location of trained
farmers the eect of distance to a trained farmer can be estimated. This is
carried out by comparing farmers close to trained farmers before and after re-
distribution. Further, this data indicates the importance of localised learning
relating to improved pest-reduction techniques. This provides further evidence
that unobservable variables specic to ethnic groups are not confounding the
results.
Empirical matching techniques are used to examine the validity of com-
paring treated and control farmers by controlling for observables non-linearly.
Matching utilises the distribution of the covariates among the treated, in or-
der to weight covariant-specic estimates and thereby estimate the eect of the
treatment on the treated (Angrist and Pischke 2008).
Uncovering the mechanisms through which the network eects of interest
may operate is examined subsequently. Detailed information for a sub-group
of communal farmers allows direct farmer-to-farmer linkages to be investigated
explicitly. This shows that, within communal farming communities, receiving
transport assistance in input provision positively aects beneciary farmers.
The information identifying communal farmer quality (seed-cotton growers,
goldclass and large communal farmers) indicates that ownership structure rather
than `quality' of farmer characteristics are important. This provides additional
evidence that proximity to large-scale commercial farmers is of primary im-
portance for the network eects of interest. This in contrast to the eects of
interest being contingent on farmer-quality, which in turn may be correlated
21with cultural racial or other unobservables, confounding the paper's identica-
tion strategy. Both Rukuni (1994) and Utete (2003) highlight appropriate farm
ownership structures as important for the development of small-holder farming,
particularly with reference to accessibility of credit in the agricultural sector.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
To identify the eect of distance from from commercial farms and the impact of
land redistribution on network eects in the cotton sector, the following is esti-
mated. Let Yir denote farmer yield per hectare, or alternate relevant outcomes
for farmer i associated with indigenous or non-indigenous commercial farms,
r = f0;1g where r represents communal farmers associated with 0 indigenous
and 1 non-indigenous commercial land. Let dir, dened here as the treatment,
measure farm distance of communal farmers t from commercial land. This rep-
resents the quasi-natural experiment and allows identication in this model.
The average treatment eect is coecient 3 in the following regression:
Yir =  + 1dir + 2ri + 3dirri + ir (4.1)
As the sample is large, but not necessarily randomly selected, it may be
preferable to include individual observable eects xir as a matrix of farm/er
characteristics (for example cotton inputs, land quality, rainfall, proximity to
gins, roads):27
Yir =  + 1dir + 2ri + 3dirri + 
xir + i4 (4.2)
Estimating equation 4.2 by ordinary least squares yields the standard dierence-
in-dierence estimator whilst controlling for observables. The sensitivity of the
results to potential selection on unobservables is also tested. Lastly, matching
estimators are used to allow for the eects of non-linear controls on the variables
of interest. Here treated and control groups are matched on observable charac-
teristics, where potential outcomes are assumed to be independent of treatment
status, conditional on these observables. Available matching estimators do not
27Dalton et al. (1997) note that productivity in Zimbabwe's small-holder agriculture sector
rises as all of labour, purchased inputs and draft capital implements increase with available
technology. Further, distance from roads signicantly increases production costs.
22allow for explicit interaction eects so matching is carried out for communal
farmers associated with indigenous and non-indigenous farmers separately.
Within this framework, describing network eects and land redistribution,
the following are expected, a priori, on the estimated coecients in equation
(4.2):
1 < 0 (4.3)
2 < 0 (4.4)
For communal farmers associated with indigenous commercial farmers, distance
aects productivity negatively, (equation (4.3)), the marginal treatment eect
of interest. Likewise, proximity of communal farmers to non-indigenous com-
mercial farms (that has been redistributed) results in a reduced productivity
in comparisons to remote farmers. If redistribution occurs in the absence of
support structures for agricultural communities it has a negative productivity
eect on those close to redistributed land (equation (4.4)).
For testable combinations of these coecients:
1 + 3 = 0 (4.5)
2 + 3 < 0 (4.6)
Redistribution does not explain productivity or household outcome variables
for communal farmers distant from non-indigenous commercial land (equation
(4.5)), the average treatment eect on the control group. Thus, a priori, it
is expected that once commercial farmers and associated network eects have
been dismantled (post-redistribution), distance to commercial farmers no longer
predicts productivity dierentials between communal farmers. This suggests
that communal farmers located some distance from commercially farmed land
did not compensate for the lack of network eects available to those communal
farmers closer to commercial farmers. Redistribution also has a negative eect
on productivity for distant farms (due to wider economic and political instability
in the country over the last 10 years) (equation (4.6)), the average treatment
23eect on the treated group. Finally:
3 > 0 (4.7)
The average treatment eect is positive in this formulation, this to counteract
2 but not surpass 1. This indicates that the control group fares relatively
better than the treatment group, due to the treatment group suering both the
disappearance of productivity enhancing network eects, as well as the economy-




Figure 9 indicates treated (within 10km of commercial land) and control (at least
10km away from commercial land) farmers for the purposes of the descriptive
statistics.28
Observable dierences between treated and control cotton farmers are inves-
tigated in Tables 1 and 3. As described in Section 3, it is expected that control
farmers have access to relatively lower quality land than their treated counter
parts. Table 1 conrms this, treated farmers have higher, wetter farms with
better quality soil. Treated farmers are also closer to roads, gins and areas con-
taining NGO-trained farmers, when compared to the control group, although
the latter are closer to goldclass farmers. Treated farmers achieve higher yields
per hectare.29
These observable dierences are controlled for in the regression and matching
analysis that follows, and are primarily a function of the historic process by
which land was acquired for commercial use.
Dierences across land farmed by indigenous and non-indigenous commercial
farmers are described in Table 2, to examine potential observable selection bias
across these groups. High levels of selection bias on observables may indicate
28Treatment is allowed to dier in intensity by distance in the regression analysis results.
29Table E1, in the Appendix, examines the mean dierence between communal cotton
farmers remaining on their land and those farmers who have beneted directly from the land
redistribution - now located on commercial land.





Yield per ha, kg 250.68 280.48 -29.80***
(3.51)
Environmental Characteristics
Altitude, m 599.34 1040.59 -441.24***
(2.88)
Rainfall (annual average), mm 749.18 833.06 -83.88***
(0.69)
Rainfall (2007), mm 817.18 877.80 -60.62***
(0.56)
Rainfall (2008), mm 739.09 820.27 -81.18***
(0.70)
Soil quality (1-7) 1.06 1.20 -0.14***
(0.00)
Proximity
Road proximity, km 3.84 3.31 0.53***
(0.06)
Gin proximity, km 56.22 30.46 25.76***
(0.42)
Trained farmer proximity, km 21.34 16.18 5.16***
(0.18)
Seed farmer, % 1.7 6.87 -5.17***
(0.22)
Goldclass proximity, km 1.05 9.36 -8.31***
(0.06)
Large farmer proximity, km 4.83 11.25 -6.42***
(0.10)
Commercial farms
Indigenous farmer, km 38.97 8.29 30.68***
(0.23)
Non-indigenous farmer, km 31.82 5.75 26.07***
(0.17)
Observations 22623 7908
Source: Cottco (2009), Cotton Training Centre (2009), Quton (2009),
Fischer et al. (2008), Matsuura and Willmott (2009) & Hijmans et al. (2005).
1 Communal cotton farmers located less that 10km from commercially farmed land.
2 Communal cotton farmers located greater than 10km from commercially farmed land.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
25Figure 9: Treated and Control Farmers, Descriptive Statistics
Sources: Farm Valuation Data, Cottco (2009) & Government of Zimbabwe (1985).
large dierences in unobservables. Non-indigenous farmers have access to higher
land, closer to roads. This is consistent with the hypothesis that proximity to
roads may proxy for violence in this identication, as non-indigenous farms have
been redistributed and thus are more likely to have experienced localised vio-
lence that may have aected surrounding communal farmers negatively. These
observed dierences are controlled for in the regressions that follow. However,
all commercial farms experience similar rainfall and soil quality.
Table 3 reports observable dierences for alternate (survey) outcome vari-
ables for the sample both before and after the redistribution. This will fa-
cilitate the empirical estimation using the conventional identication strategy.
Here, before the redistribution, treated farmers record better employment, edu-
cation, access to infrastructure (access to piped water, cooking fuels) and non-
agricultural assets (grain mills). The control group reports higher agricultural
asset ownership: ploughs, cattle, goats, scotch-carts and wheelbarrows. Al-
though this picture remains broadly similar after the redistribution some inter-
esting changes have occurred. For example, post-redistribution control farmers
report higher relative access to cooking fuel (paran) although this gure has
26Table 2: Geographic Land Characteristics: Indigenous and Non-Indigenous
Commercial Farms (Mean Dierences)
Indigenous Non-Indigenous Mean Dierence
Altitude, m 1154.20 1255.13 -100.93***
(18.64)
Rainfall (annual average), mm 861.93 861.23 0.70
(3.72)
Soil Quality (1-7) 1.52 1.63 -0.11
0.09
Roads, km 3.69 3.06 0.63**
(0.35)
Observations 75 816
Source: Cottco (2009), Farm Valuation Data (2010) Fischer et al. (2008),
Matsuura and Willmott (2009), & Hijmans et al. (2005).
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
reduced for both groups. The reversal in relative access to paran will be of
importance in the robustness tests following the primary results. Here paran
provision for example, may be linked to distribution channels vulnerable to the
post-redistribution disruption for treated farmers.
Table 4 shows that treated communal farmers have less hectarage under cot-
ton than control farmers, providing evidence that proximate communal farmers
were not aected directly by the recent land reform. Increased cotton-hectarage
for control groups likely re
ects the high population densities in more fertile
areas of the country, those typically farmed by commercial farmers in Mashona-
land. This is acquires more weight given that the dierence is not aected by
redistribution.30
Hectarage may be inversely related to productivity (Carter 1984). In order
to control for this in the main results I proxy seed use for hectarage under
cotton.31 Table 5 shows the correlation between seed use and hectarage, at
least up to 10 hectares, which accounts for over 99% of the sample.
Within the `detailed sub-group' (200 farmers), comparisons can be made
between those farmers who receive assistance (in the form of transportation of
inputs) from other farmers and those who do not access this additional sup-
30Table E2, in the Appendix, shows that treated farmers are relatively closer to non-
indigenously redistributed commercial land than farms that continue to be farmed by in-
digenous commercial farmers. This is expected to bias the estimation results downwards as
farmer access to network eects is a function of distance to commercial land.
31As hectarage forms part of the dependent productivity measure a proxy is required here.
27Table 3: Survey Outcomes (%): Treated and Control Farmers, 1995 and 2001
(Mean Dierences)
1995 2001
Control1 Treated2 Mean Di. Control1 Treated2 Mean Di.
Employment 28.43 38.51 -10.08*** 5.20 28.51 -23.30***
(0.10) (0.13)
Cook with 0.62 1.81 -1.18*** 0.39 0.30 0.08***
Paran (0.03) (0.01)
Water, piped 0.21 2.14 -1.93*** 0.28 2.58 -2.30***
(0.03) (0.04)
Waged income 6.29 28.18 -21.89*** 13.28 6.93 6.35***
(0.13) (0.10)
Proximity to 18.15 20.86 -2.71*** 0.00 0.00 -0.00
grainmill (0.04) (0.00)
Schooling 77.75 84.96 -7.21*** 83.74 86.98 -3.24***
(0.08) (0.05)
Cook with 0.02 2.28 -2.25*** 0.02 3.73 -3.71***
Electricity (0.03) (0.04)
Radio 6.08 9.79 -3.71*** 9.56 13.35 -3.79***
(0.03) (0.03)
Bicycle 3.13 5.31 -2.19*** 6.18 7.59 -1.41***
(0.02) (0.03)
Plough 7.50 2.88 4.61*** 10.55 2.80 7.75***
(0.05) (0.03)
Cattle 8.64 2.67 5.97*** 10.93 3.08 7.85***
(0.04) (0.04)
Goat 8.23 1.53 6.69*** 11.36 2.67 8.69***
(0.04) (0.05)
Scotchcart 2.06 1.62 2.56*** 4.95 1.65 3.30***
(0.04) (0.03)
Wheelbarrow 4.12 1.56 2.56*** 8.50 2.47 6.02***
(0.04) (0.05)
Observations 22623 7908 22623 7908
Source: Cottco (2009) & Central Statistics Oce (1997, 2005)
1 Communal cotton farmers located less that 10km from commercially farmed land.
2 Communal cotton farmers located greater than 10km from commercially farmed land.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Communal Farm Cotton Hectarage: by Proximity to Indigenous, Non-




Mean No. of Obs. Mean No. of Obs. Mean Di.
Communal farms, ha 2.89 22623 2.33 7908 0.55***
(0.11)
Indigenous, ha 2.87 24359 2.25
3 6172 0.61***
(0.12)
Non-Indigenous, ha 2.88 22750 2.32
3 7781 0.55***
(0.11)
Source: Cottco (2009) & Farm Valuation Data (2010)
1 Communal cotton farmers located less that 10km from commercially farmed land.
2 Communal cotton farmers located greater than 10km from commercially farmed land.
3 Seen in Table E2 the mean dierence between these gures is not signicant.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
28Table 5: Communal Farmer Seed Use, by Hectarage (Mean Dierence, kg)
Proportion Number Mean Seed Use Mean Dierence
1ha 16.35 4,993 15.39
>1ha & <=2ha 47.25 14,426 21.11 -5.72***
(0.21)
>2ha & <=5ha 31.38 9,581 24.79 -3.68***
(0.19)
>5ha & <=10ha 4.65 1,420 27.21 -2.43***
(0.46)
>10ha 0.37 111 29.36 -2.05
(1.80)
Total 100 30,531 21.64
Source: Cottco (2009)
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
port. Table 6 shows that assisted farmers are, on average, worse o on available
parameters than those farmers who do not receive assistance from secondary
communal farmers in their communities. Here, assisted farmers achieve lower
yields and lower employment, on average. Similarly these assisted farmers utilise
less seed, fertilizer, herbicide and other inputs (indicating they have access to
less Cottco credit than the comparison group) and their land is lower, drier and
further from roads, gins, trained farmers, goldclass/large/commercial farmers
than unassisted farmers. They do however have better soil quality and access
to paran as a cooking fuel than their unassisted counterparts. Recalling Table
3 it can be noted that paran access may be a good proxy for access to network
eects as paran is vulnerable to disruption of localised distribution channels.32
These descriptive statistics indicate that identication may be dicult for the
robustness test utilising the detailed sub-group data, especially if more vulnera-
ble and/or lower quality farmers are more likely to avail of local assistance with
input transportation than more productive farmers as may be expected given
the descriptive statistics.
Finally, Tables 7, 8 and 9 report summary statistics and expected regression
coecient signs for the primary sample, survey outcome data and detailed sub-
sample, respectively.
32Table E3, in the Appendix, compares characteristics of the detailed sub-group with the
full sample.
29Table 6: Farm/er Characteristics: Assisted and Unassisted Farmers - Detailed
Sub-Sample (Mean Dierence)
Unassisted Farmers Assisted Farmers Mean Di.
Outcome Variables
Yield per ha, kg 537.29 365.81 171.47***
(55.58)
Paran, % 0.56 0.79 0.22**
(0.12)
Employment, % 15.22 11.81 3.41**
(1.95)
Farm Input Characteristics
Seed, kg 12.64 4.21 8.42***
(1.25)
Fertilizer, % 78.57 52.94 25.63***
(6.51)
Herbicide, % 16.33 0.00 16.33***
(3.68)
Other inputs, % 36.73 4.90 31.83***
(5.27)
Environmental Characteristics
Altitude, m 922.26 797.76 124.50***
(47.34)
Rainfall (annual average), mm 841.67 829.38 12.29**
(6.85)
Soil quality (1-7) 1.04 1.00 0.04**
(0.02)
Proximity
Road proximity, km 1.69 3.45 -1.76***
(0.35)
Gin proximity, km 24.21 24.54 0.32
(3.51)
Trained farmer proximity, km 14.12 18.62 -4.50***
(1.82)
Seed farmer, % 47.31 12.94 34.37***
(6.47)
Goldclass farmer, km 1.43 3.21 -1.77***
(0.51)
Large farmer , km 10.64 14.55 -3.91***
(1.58)
Indigenous, km 14.00 18.28 -4.28**
(1.95)
Non-Indigenous, km 9.37 12.63 -3.26**
(1.69)
Observations 92 86
Source: Cottco (2009), Cotton Training Centre (2009), Quton (2009), Fischer et al. (2008),
Matsuura and Willmott (2009), Hijmans et al. (2005) & Farm Valuation Data (2010).
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
30Table 7: Summary Statistics: Farm/er Characteristics (Communal Farmers)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max Expected
Dev. Sign
Hectares, ha 30531 2.74 8.66 1.00 800.00
Total yield, kg 30531 647.96 823.60 10.00 20190.00
Yield per ha, kg 30531 258.40 269.25 0.08 7490.00
Fertilizer, kg 30531 36.63 50.21 0.00 750.00 (+)
Seed, kg 30531 21.64 14.42 0.00 130.00 (+= )
Soil quality (1-7) 30531 1.49 0.60 1.00 3.00 ( )
Rainfall (annual average), mm 30531 770.90 64.11 627.00 970.00 (+)
Rainfall (2007), mm 30531 832.88 50.75 644.90 927.40 (+)
Rainfall (2008), mm 30531 760.12 64.25 541.10 863.00 (+)
Altitude, m 30531 713.63 293.37 342.00 1505.00 (+)
Road proximity, km 30531 3.70 4.49 0.00 34.20 (+)
Gin proximity, km 30531 49.55 34.14 0.00 153.05 ( )
Trained farmer proximity, km 30531 20.00 13.95 0.00 62.54 ( )
Seed farmer, % 30531 3.04 17.16 0.00 100.00 (+)
Goldclass farmer proximity, km 30531 3.20 5.84 0.00 26.48 ( )
Large farmer proximity, km 30531 6.49 8.48 0.00 46.50 ( )
Indigenous farmer, km 30531 31.02 21.91 2.41 114.17 ( )
Non-indigenous farmer, km 30531 25.07 17.03 2.41 78.86 ( )
Source: Cottco (2009), Cotton Training Centre (2009), Quton (2009), Fischer et al. (2008),
Matsuura and Willmott (2009), Hijmans et al. (2005) & Farm Valuation Data (2010).
Table 8: Summary Statistics: Survey Data (%)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Employment, 1995 30531 31.04 8.64 9.82 54.64
Employment, 2001 30531 11.24 14.50 0.00 53.82
Piped water, 1995 30531 0.71 2.67 0.00 18.67
Piped water, 2001 30531 0.88 3.05 0.00 20.77
Waged income, 1995 30531 10.59 15.68 0.00 48.63
Waged income, 2001 30531 11.96 13.96 0.00 50.00
Schooling, 1995 30531 79.62 6.83 67.90 94.93
Schooling, 2001 30531 84.58 4.17 70.85 97.76
Cattle 1995 30531 7.09 4.08 0.00 15.31
Cattle 2001 30531 8.90 4.66 0.00 17.02
Source: Cottco (2009) & Central Statistics Oce (1997, 2005).
31Table 9: Summary Statistics: Detailed Sub-Sample
Variable Obs Mean Std. Min Max Expected
Dev. Sign
Hectares, ha 166 4.59 4.73 1.00 35.00
Yield per ha, kg 157 455.38 357.25 5.00 1505.00
Receives assistance, % 200 65.00 47.82 0.00 100.00 (+)
Collects own inputs, % 192 47.40 50.06 0.00 100.00 (+)
Number of assisting farmers 132 1.23 0.44 1.00 3.00 (+)
Average distance to Seedholder, km 132 25.75 40.34 0.00 143.16 ( )
Asset ownership, % 200 33.50 47.32 0.00 100.00 (+)
Seed, kg 189 8.27 9.57 1.00 80.00 (+)
Fertilizer, % 200 65.50 47.66 0.00 100.00 (+)
Compound (fertilizer), kg 78 11.62 12.93 1.00 60.00 (+)
Ammonium nitrate(fertilizer), kg 126 5.55 8.85 1.00 56.00 (+)
Other inputs,
1 % 200 20.50 40.47 0.00 100.00 (+)
Insecticide, % 200 94.00 23.81 0.00 100.00 (+)
Marshal(insecticide), kg 89 5.65 8.12 1.00 62.00 (+)
Larvin(insecticide), kg 76 6.82 9.18 1.00 70.00 (+)
Herbicide, % 200 8.00 27.20 0.00 100.00 (+)
Magnum(herbicide), kg 15 2.87 2.33 1.00 8.00 (+)
Source: Cottco (2009).
1 Dummy variable taking the value 1 when a farmer uses insecticide and/or herbicide.
5.2 Main results
Table 10 provides empirical motivation for the regression results that follow.
Column (1) indicates that having controlled for observed dierences between
them, proximity to commercially farmed land is a signicant explanatory vari-
able for productivity (dened here as yield per hectare). When the sample is
divided into communal farmers associated with indigenous and non-indigenous
commercial farms, proximity to non-indigenous farms is unable to explain pro-
ductivity dierences between communal farmers, whilst proximity to indigenously-
farmed land is positively related to agricultural productivity gains. This mo-
tivates the paper's identication strategy: the type of commercial land cotton
farmers are proximate to is of importance to productivity outcomes once redis-
tribution has been carried out. This is attributed to network eects, suggesting
that removal of commercial farmers has occurred to the detriment of commu-
nal cotton productivity. Other control variables have the expected signs and
signicance.33
33Rainfall has been excluded as it seldom enters the regression results signicantly.
32Table 10: Empirical Motivation
Yield per ha (1) (2) (3)
Treated
1, (D) 29.72*** 58.06*** 8.02
(6.56) (20.69) (7.84)
Fert, kg 0.70*** 0.95*** 0.59***
(0.04) (0.11) (0.05)
Seed, kg 0.22** -0.06 0.39***
(0.11) (0.27) (0.13)
Altitude, m -0.01 -0.36*** 0.02*
(0.01) (0.09) (0.01)
Soil quality (1-7) -13.05** -57.26*** -5.35
(5.38) (17.35) (5.94)
Roads, km 1.17*** 2.35* 1.70***
(0.33) (1.38) (0.35)
Gins, km -0.16** -0.67 -0.21***
(0.07) (0.52) (0.08)
Trained farmer, km -0.30** -3.53*** 0.14
(0.13) (0.95) (0.14)
Seed farmer, (D) 117.40*** 30.65 148.76***
(13.98) (24.07) (20.27)
Goldclass, (D) 104.30*** 257.56*** 92.91***
(7.94) (45.5) (8.28)
Large farmer, (D) -179.97*** -449.85*** -169.61***
(17.49) (42.40) (17.87)
Year, (D) -50.35*** -55.54*** -51.13***
(3.06) (7.99) (3.38)
Region, (D) 42.38*** 55.81*** 57.33***
(4.65) (13.98) (5.39)
Constant 245.45*** 672.02*** 202.02***
(11.09) (98.55) (12.07)
Observations 30,531 5,172 24,237
R
2 0.062 0.076 0.058
Specication All Communal Farmers Communal Farmers
Observations Assoc. with Assoc. with
Indig. Farmers Non-Indig. Farmers
1Where `Treated'=Communal farmers within 10km of commercial farms,
`Untreated'=Communal farmers further than 10km from commercial farms.
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
33Table 11 contains the paper's primary results. The initial specication (Col-
umn (1)) shows that without controlling for environmental or farm characteris-
tics distance to commercial land, land reform and their interaction are all im-
portant for determining cotton-farming productivity. The signs on these coe-
cients conform to a priori expectations: distance negatively aects productivity
for communal farmers associated with indigenous commercial farmers, redistri-
bution is negative for all treated farmers and the interaction eect is positive.
These primary results survive the introduction of environmental, farm-level,
year and region controls (Column (2)). Relative proximity of communal land
to other locations of interest (trained farmers) is controlled for in Column (3),
as well as observed quality characteristics (seed growers, goldclass and large
farmers) of communal farmers.
This baseline specication (Column (3)), shows the expected signs on the dis-
tance, redistribution and interaction variables. Thus, distance from commercial
land has a negative eect on productivity for communal farmers associated with
indigenous commercial farms whilst redistribution has a negative productivity
eect on those close to redistributed land (on disruption of the network eects of
interest). The redistribution eect is larger than the distance eect: it is worse
for cotton productivity to be close to a redistributed (non-indigenous) commer-
cial farm than to be far away from non-redistributed land (indigenously farmed
land). The interaction eect (average treatment eect) is positive: those com-
munal farmers isolated from commercially farmed land have fared better than
those relatively closer as a result of the redistribution. The redistribution eect
is large relative to average yield per hectare (258kg/ha, seen in Table 7).
T-tests in Table 12 indicate that the overall eect of redistribution for prox-
imate farmers (average treatment eect on the treated) is negative (due mainly
to the wider economic collapse) and conrm that distance does not matter for
productivity post-redistribution (average treatment on the controls).
The farm-level control variables have the predicted signs and are signi-
cant. Fertilizer and seed inputs34 are positively associated with productivity,
as is rainfall and soil quality35 (with a large coecient relative to the other
34Increased seed usage is correlated with increased land holdings (Table 5), at least up to
10 hectares. Thus, seed here proxies for relative land holdings among communal farmers.
35By construction, soil quality deteriorates as the size of this (categorical) variable increases.
34Table 11: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Distance, km -2.22*** -1.87*** -2.18*** -2.18*** -3.22*** -1.25** -1.03**
(0.42) (0.50) (0.50) (0.81) (0.81) (0.62) (0.51)
Redistribution, (D) -21.88*** -31.72*** -35.79*** -35.79*** -39.87*** -35.84*** -23.28***
(6.59) (7.03) (7.05) (12.15) (10.14) (9.80) (7.82)
D*R 1.22*** 1.93*** 2.35*** 2.35*** 3.17*** 1.90*** 1.47***
(0.43) (0.44) (0.44) (0.69) (0.73) (0.53) (0.46)
Fert, kg 0.93*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.77*** 0.62*** 0.64***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
Seed, kg 0.00 0.11 0.11 -0.31* 0.60*** 0.28**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.17) (0.15) (0.11)
Altitude, m 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.03* 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Soil quality (1-7) -20.74*** -12.44** -12.44 -18.17*** -5.72 -6.70
(5.40) (5.36) (9.42) (6.53) (9.60) (5.63)
Roads, km 1.45*** 1.25*** 1.25** 3.66*** -0.13 1.30***
(0.33) (0.33) (0.63) (0.67) (0.36) (0.34)
Gins, km -0.57*** -0.42*** -0.42** -0.25* -0.66*** -0.41***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.20) (0.15) (0.17) (0.12)
Trained farmer, km -0.37*** -0.37 -0.69*** -0.02 -0.02
(0.13) (0.27) (0.20) (0.17) (0.13)
Seed grower, (D) 114.39*** 114.39*** 111.75*** 120.92*** 120.79***
(12.50) (19.93) (17.44) (17.93) (15.16)
Goldclass, (D) 106.46*** 106.46*** 108.12*** 103.81*** 99.04***
(7.63) (25.66) (12.98) (8.95) (7.92)
Large farmer, (D) -175.93*** -175.93*** -193.96*** -157.00*** -168.68***
(17.31) (21.58) (26.60) (21.93) (17.98)
Year, (D) -48.00*** -50.42*** -50.42*** -50.21***
(3.04) (3.02) (6.10) (3.07)
Region, (D) 21.65*** 32.16*** 32.16*** 25.51*** 40.48*** 52.80***
(4.46) (4.48) (10.50) (6.49) (6.44) (4.70)
Constant 304.17*** 309.31*** 287.75*** 287.75*** 313.49*** 202.54*** 223.32***
(5.68) (13.18) (13.39) (27.76) (19.06) (18.51) (13.96)
Observations 31,653 31,653 31,653 31,653 16,519 15,134 29,807
R-squared 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
Specication Treatment Controls Baseline Group 2008 2009 Marginals
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 12: T-tests on Coecients of Interest: Main Regression Results
T-test Accept/Reject
D = D*R F(1, 31637) 0.57 Prob > F 0.45
R = D*R F(1, 31637) 26.72 Prob > F 0.00
35environmental and agricultural control variables).
The roads proximity variable is consistently positive. Insofar as violence
or the threat thereof often accompanies redistribution of commercial land and
may spill over into adjoining communal land, this may re
ect the eect of po-
litical violence on cotton productivity rather than the eect of access to roads
themselves (which would enter with an expected negative sign here). Further,
non-indigenous land (the focus of the political violence) is signicantly closer
to roads than indigenous land,36 indicating that redistribution may have been
largely opportunistic and thus facilitated by road proximity. The region dummy
(taking the value 0 in northern Muzarabani and 1 in the Bindura and Glendale
areas) may re
ect reduced political violence in the north of the country where
there are few urban areas and indeed few commercial farms, another control for
unrest in the province.
Relative proximity to gins as well as NGO-trained farmers is positively re-
lated to productivity. Identifying as a goldclass and/or a seed-cotton grower are
large, positive and signicant for productivity. This informs one of the robust-
ness specications to follow. Further having 10 or more hectares under cotton
negatively aects productivity. This is most likely to occur as larger communal
farmers face binding credit and other resource constraints with increased land
access. Last, the year dummy (taking the value 0 in 2008 and 1 in 2009) may
pick up the deteriorating economic and political conditions in the country, espe-
cially hyperin
ation which accelerated dramatically between the 2008 and 2009
seasons (Hanke and Kwok 2009).
Column (4) in Table 11 clusters the standard errors by `group', a function
of how farmers are organised within the Cottco credit-input structure. Farmers
wishing to avail of Cottco's credit-input scheme are required to form groups with
other cotton farmers in order to access credit. Although credit is disbursed at
the individual farmer level, the group structure allows an extra level of credit
repayment control by Cottco. If one person in the group is unable to repay
the company satisfactorily, credit will be withheld from the entire group in the
following year. The groups are primarily then a function of location. The results
survive, with some increase in the size of the standard errors.
36As seen in Table 2.
36The data on cotton inputs and outputs comprises information for the 2008
and 2009 agricultural seasons. Separating these two sub-samples, columns (5)
and (6) respectively, sees a change in the size of the coecients on distance,
redistribution and the interaction term. This indicates a slight weakening of
the negative eect of redistribution over time.
Last, column (7) shows results for the reduced sample: here those farmers
equidistant from commercial land (within a 25km radius) are excluded from
the regression to test for robustness on the construction of the dierence-in-
dierence specication. Coecient signs are maintained but there is some loss
of signicance for the soil quality and trained farmer controls. That the main
results survive indicates these `marginal' farmers are not driving the identi-
cation of the network eects of interest. The coecients on soil quality and
trained farmers loose their signicance in columns (4) ,(6) and (7). This may
be due to lack of variation in these variables, as discussed previously regarding
soil quality in particular (see Figure 3).
5.3 Robustness Tests
The primary identication and sample are then augmented with additional data.
Alternate outcome variables and details of a training scheme provide pre- and
post-redistribution data and are used to test the validity of the identication
strategy. Nearest-neighbour matching examines the robustness of the primary
results to non-linear controls. Alternate specications allow several possible
mechanisms to be illuminated through which the network eects of interest
may operate. Details on linkages between farmers tests the importance of ac-
cess to transportation and therefore timely delivery of inputs to farmers. Data
on communal farmer proximity to identied high-quality communal farmers fa-
cilitates testing of the relative importance of land ownership structures and
farmer-quality to agricultural outcomes via network eects.
First, the validity of the primary identication strategy is examined using al-
ternate outcome variables from the Zimbabwean CSO, the specication in Table
13 substitutes Income Consumption and Expenditure Survey (ICES) outcome
variables for yield per hectare and allows for explicit examination of pre- and
37post-redistribution eects.37 As eects on agricultural productivity are the pri-
mary concern of the paper, controls related to this productivity are maintained
here. The results, based on alternate outcome variables, broadly conrm the
paper's main conclusions.
For example, outcome variables measuring employment (column (1)), access
to piped water (column (2)) and proportion of people receiving waged income
(column (3)), re
ect the baseline results on the dierence-in-dierence variables
of interest, although there is some loss of sign and signicance for the control
variables. The latter is to be expected as the explanatory variables are con-
structed primarily to control for agricultural productivity drivers, rather than
survey outcome covariates, in most cases. T-tests comparing coecient sizes,
shown in Table 14, do not reject the a priori signs and relative sizes of the
coecients of interest between the main results and this alternate specication.
Where the regression results are inconsistent with the primary hypothesis
the following can be noted. The positive redistribution eect on schooling may
re
ect the large increase (seen in Table 3) in the proportion of people with at
least basic schooling that occurred between the 1995 and 2001 rounds of the
household survey.38 This is similar to the results using cattle ownership as the
dependent variable (column (5)) for the positive eect of redistribution. On
the other hand, the positive eect of distance in (5) may re
ect an artefact of
communal farming practice in Zimbabwe, that is over-accumulation of cattle
relative to sustainable grazing resources. This as cattle represent one of the few
assets in communal farming communities that can be used as collateral to raise
private credit. Cattle ownership is thus one of the few ways communal farmers
have in order to achieve investment in their farms.39
Table 15 substitutes `distance from areas containing NGO-trained farmers'
for `distance from commercial land' as the treatment. The redistribution indi-
37The number of observations increases to 66,174 from the baseline specication of 31,653 as
survey outcome variables are available for all farmers (at the enumeration area level) whereas
nearly 30,000 farmers do not record cotton output in the Cottco data and are therefore
excluded from the baseline estimation.
38For example, Dore et al. (2008) notes the deterioration in social outcomes that has oc-
curred since 2001 is concurrent with wider economic, social and political decline, especially in
rural areas with regards to educational outcomes. Thus, `...poverty took on an increasingly
rural...face' (Dore et al. 2008, p.17).
39Rukuni (1994, p.41) notes that `(l)evels of private investment into immovable assets in the
(c)ommunal (a)reas is minimal, while that into movable assets like livestock has been large.'
38Table 13: Robustness: Alternate Outcome Variables (Survey Data)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable Employment Piped Waged Schooling Cattle
Water Income
Distance, km -0.60*** -0.15*** -1.26*** -0.16*** 0.28***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
Redistribution, (D) -26.02*** -1.45*** -21.45*** 3.77*** 6.02***
(0.18) (0.05) (0.20) (0.07) (0.05)
D*R 0.60*** 0.16*** 1.32*** -0.02*** -0.31***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
Fert, kg -0.00*** 0.00*** -0.01*** 0.01*** -0.00***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Seed, kg 0.05*** -0.00** 0.07*** 0.00 -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Altitude, m 0.02*** 0.00*** 0.02*** 0.00*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Soil quality (1-7) -3.15*** -1.32*** -2.14*** 2.29*** 1.99***
(0.13) (0.04) (0.14) (0.05) (0.04)
Roads, km 0.02** -0.01*** 0.12*** -0.04*** -0.05***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Gins, km -0.14*** -0.04*** -0.18*** 0.04*** 0.07***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Trained farmer, km 0.16*** -0.00*** 0.18*** 0.09*** -0.01***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Seed grower, (D) 0.13 2.51*** -1.55*** 3.24*** -0.95***
(0.24) (0.07) (0.26) (0.10) (0.07)
Goldclass, (D) 3.91*** 1.28*** 3.28*** 0.04 -0.70***
(0.17) (0.05) (0.19) (0.07) (0.05)
Large farmer, (D) 0.40 -0.21 0.41 -0.96*** 0.03
(0.70) (0.21) (0.77) (0.29) (0.22)
Year, (D) 1.29*** 0.21*** 1.12*** 0.12*** -0.36***
(0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02)
Region, (D) 0.55*** -2.11*** 3.30*** -0.91*** -0.52***
(0.11) (0.03) (0.12) (0.05) (0.03)
Constant 25.09*** 4.68*** 17.01*** 79.80*** 5.11***
(0.32) (0.10) (0.35) (0.13) (0.10)
Observations 66,174 66,174 66,174 66,174 66,174
R
2 0.59 0.21 0.45 0.32 0.58
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
39Table 14: T-tests on Coecients of Interest: Survey Outcome Results
T-test Accept/Reject
D = D*R
Employment F(1, 66158) 0.03 Prob > F 0.86
Piped Water F(1, 66158) 119.86 Prob > F 0.00
Waged Income F(1, 66158) 131.76 Prob > F 0.00
R = D*R
Employment F(1, 66158) 20133.08 Prob > F 0.00
Piped Water F(1, 66158) 790.08 Prob > F 0.00
Waged Income F(1, 66158) 12253.54 Prob > F 0.00
cator takes the value 1 for those cotton farmers relatively close to NGO-trained
farmers from 2000 onwards, and 0 otherwise, thereby utilising pre- and post-
redistribution data explicitly. Column (2) is the specication of interest here.
When the full sample40 of cotton farmers is used, the dierence-in-dierence
identication design re
ects the positive eects that proximity to trained com-
munal farmers has on farm level productivity. The coecient on this alternate
distance measure is signicant, if smaller in size, to the eect of distance (to
commercial farms) in the main results. Redistribution remains negative and
large for productivity, suggesting that redistribution and the attendant eco-
nomic decline disrupted post-training support structures for those communities
proximate to trained communal farmers. This further validates the paper's pre-
ferred identication strategy as well as providing evidence that in the absence
of commercial farms remaining communal farming communities may be able
to replicate the network eects of interest in time. Discussion of the CTC in
Section 3 supports this interpretation. Specically, this mechanism indicates
the importance of pest reduction on cotton productivity, as evidenced by the
emphasis placed on pest reduction during the CTC training and the positive
local spillover eects that are generated on wider dissemination of this knowl-
edge. Whilst commercial farmers in Mashonaland Central grow a variety of
crops tobacco has particular importance as an export crop. As tobacco requires
high pesticide inputs the associated localised pest reduction may inform one
of the commercial farmer network eects that characterises the relationship of
40The full sample comprises 47,000 observations, across both Mashonaland Central and
East.
40primary interest here.41
Table 15: Robustness: Proximity to NGO-Trained Farmers
Yield per ha (1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance, km -0.02 -0.29*** -0.20** -0.15
(0.13) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Redistribution, (D) -39.75** -122.61
(19.02) (167.54)
D*R 1.28** 6.52 -1.65
(0.62) (9.14) (2.78)
Fert, kg 0.66*** 0.71*** 0.72*** 0.72***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Seed, kg 0.25** 0.20** 0.18* 0.20**
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Altitude, m 0.03** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.04***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Soil quality (1-7) -22.57*** 1.31 -0.44 -3.49
(5.50) (4.08) (4.02) (4.20)
Roads, km 1.49*** 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.46***
(0.38) (0.28) (0.32) (0.32)
Gins, km -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.36*** -0.38***
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Seed grower, (D) 117.03*** 85.36*** 96.32*** 118.57***
(9.41) (8.41) (7.09) (8.25)
Goldclass, (D) 104.55*** 103.13*** 100.49*** 95.31***
(5.96) (6.96) (5.46) (5.53)
Large farmers, (D) -179.61*** -173.11*** -179.87*** -186.97***
(25.07) (14.43) (21.56) (22.28)
Year, (D) -51.61*** -55.10*** -54.82*** -54.56***
(3.09) (2.56) (2.71) (2.76)
Region, (D) 48.06*** 38.13*** 39.45*** 40.29***
(4.72) (3.56) (3.92) (4.00)
Constant 281.13*** 216.96*** 243.21*** 243.27***
(18.55) (18.48) (20.80) (21.36)
Observations 30,531 47,000 40,143 38,285
R
2 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
Specication Baseline Full Mash Non-Resettled
Sample Sample Central Only
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
T-tests comparing coecient sizes, shown in Table 16, do not reject the a
priori signs and relative sizes of the coecients of interest between the main
results and this alternate specication.
Table 17 shows the primary linear estimation strategy altered to allow for
41See Appendix F for further information.
41Table 16: T-tests on Coecients of Interest: Trained Farmer Results
T-test Accept/Reject
D = D*R F(1, 46973) 0.03 Prob > F 0.86
R = D*R F(1, 46973) 8.98 Prob > F 0.00
non-linear relationships between covariates and the dependent variable. This al-
lows for heterogeneity of the treatment eects. The nearest-neighbour matching
estimator, proposed by Abadie and Imbens (2006), is used. This non-parametric
approach bypasses the diculties associated with propensity-score matching, es-
pecially balancedness on an a priori set of observables and the validity of boot-
strapped standard errors.42 Thus, columns (1) and (2) investigate the eect
of distance on communal farmers. Column (1) conrms the main results that
distance (d = 1) is negative for productivity, this broadly conforms to the expec-
tations on 1 previously. Column (2) indicates that, when utilising matching
techniques, distance from commercial land may still be negative for produc-
tivity although the size of the coecient has more than halved in size. This
conrms conclusions from the primary analysis, namely of a reduced distance
eect due to the reduced networks eects now available to near-by communal
farmers, this signicant eect is driven by the economy wide contraction evi-
dent post-redistribution in the country. Columns (3) and (4) show results for
the eect of redistribution explicitly. Column (3) shows a negative eect for
communal farmers close to commercial land when comparing those associated
with indigenous and non-indigenous commercial farms. Redistribution is nega-
tive for productivity as pro-productivity network eects are removed, broadly
conforming to the expectations on 2 previously. Column (4) shows that distant
communal farmers benet, at the margin, on redistribution. This is in contrast
to distant communal farmers associated with indigenous commercial farms. The
combined eects illustrated by columns (2) and (4) go some way to replicating
the expected sign on 3 described previously. Although, the empirical limita-
tions of the matching technique employed here does not allow this eect to be
examined denitively here.
42The matching is carried out using four specications allowing investigation of the rela-
tionships of interest. This is necessary as available estimators do not allow for interaction
terms explicitly.
42Table 17: Robustness: Matching Estimator
Yield per ha (1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated
1 communal farmers -71.27 -29.89 -47.72 126.54
(9.11)*** (10.52)*** (10.53)*** (20.84)***
Observations 8795 7902 12874 1357
Matches 2 2 2 2
Specication r = 0; r = 1; r = 0;1; r = 0;1;
Specication d = 0;1 d = 0;1 d = 0 d = 1
1`Treatment' here refers to distance (as is standard in the paper) for columns (1) & (2);
whereas in columns (3) & (4) treatment refers to redistribution. This is in order to examine
the eects of both where interaction eects cannot be included with the nearest-neighbour
estimator available. Note similar controls to those employed in the primary specications are
used here. Common support is established prior to each matching exercise by rening the
sample after running logit regressions on treated/untreated sub-samples.
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 18: Robustness: Detailed Sub-Sample (Identication Issue)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable Yield per ha Paran Cattle Yield per ha Paran Cattle
Average distance to -2.05*** -0.01*** -0.02*
named Seedholder, km (0.52) (0.00) (0.01)
Average distance -2.23*** -0.01*** -0.01
to Seedholder, km (0.55) (0.00) (0.01)
Constant 407.84*** 0.94*** 8.68*** 501.55*** 0.89*** 7.07***
(36.15) (0.10) (0.35) (31.83) (0.07) (0.38)
Observations 95 112 112 157 178 178
R2 0.08 0.22 0.03 0.04 0.17 0.00
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Examination of detailed information available for 200 farmers within the
larger sample of communal cotton farmers shows that when controlling for iden-
tied linkages between farmers receiving and providing assistance, timely deliv-
ery of agricultural inputs is important for cotton productivity, especially for
`weaker' farmers. This is a revealed mechanism through which the paper's main
network eects operate. Table 18 conrms that distance from `seed-holder'
farmers (identied as providing transportation of inputs to other farmers) is
negatively associated with cotton productivity, access to cooking fuel and asset
levels. Distance from named seed-holders is augmented with distance from the
closest seed-holder in the area for columns (4), (5) and (6). Some signicance
is lost, though the results hold overall.
Table 19 controls for agricultural inputs as well as environmental conditions,
43which prove weaker (lack of signicance although correct signs are maintained)
explanatory variables than in the main analysis despite more detailed informa-
tion being available. This is due in part to the low sample size. Table 19 does
however indicate consistency with earlier results regarding signs on the variables
of interest, distance from seed-holders - negative - and a dummy variable indi-
cating when farmers receive assistance from others - positive - although this is
not signicant for specication (6).
Table 19: Robustness: Detailed Sub-Sample
Yield per ha (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Average distance to -1.80***
named Seedholder, km (0.59)
Average distance -1.38** -1.36**
to Seedholder, km (0.60) (0.60)
Received assistance, (D) 9.47
(58.62)
Fert, (D) 144.98*** 82.83 21.83 53.65 55.31
(55.47) (56.66) (63.44) (56.08) (56.55)
Seed, kg 5.87* 3.66 0.74 3.80 3.89
(3.05) (2.99) (11.42) (3.04) (3.05)
Other inputs, (D) 176.05*
(93.06)
Soil quality (1-7) -278.14** -267.07* -218.24 -218.13
(139.00) (142.20) (136.02) (136.72)
Goldclass, (D) 374.08*** 284.96*** 342.82*** 279.84*** 284.21***
(64.18) (86.80) (77.15) (88.82) (93.27)
Constant 261.71*** 620.78*** 548.14*** 365.74*** 548.76*** 540.46***
(43.00) (141.87) (149.75) (73.35) (137.50) (147.77)
Observations 151 154 148 89 148 148
R2 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.12 0.24 0.24
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 20 reproduces column (6) in Table 19 for two alternate dependent
variables, access to paran as cooking fuel and cattle ownership. Although
some of the control variables are compromised here with regards to sign,43 the
signicant controls consistently display the expected signs and, importantly, the
dummy variable indicating farms that rely solely on input transportation from
proximate seed-holders is signicant and positive for both access to paran and
cattle ownership.
Finally, as seen in the main results, belonging to the groups of goldclass, large
43As the explanatory variables are constructed primarily to control for agricultural produc-
tivity drivers, rather than ICES outcome covariates, it may be expected that some confounding
of coecients is possible.
44Table 20: Robustness: Detailed Sub-Sample (Alternate Outcome Variables)
(1) (2) (3)
Dependent Variable Yield per ha Paran Cattle
Average distance to Seedholder, km -1.36** -0.01*** -0.02**
(0.60) (0.00) (0.01)
Received assistance, (D) 9.47 0.39*** 1.49*
(58.62) (0.12) (0.78)
Fert, (D) 55.31 0.95*** -2.80***
(56.55) (0.11) (0.73)
Seed, kg 3.89 0.00 -0.02
(3.05) (0.00) (0.04)
Soil quality (1-7) -218.13 -0.08 0.61
(136.72) (0.18) (1.95)
Goldclass, (D) 284.21*** -0.16 -1.40
(93.27) (0.17) (1.25)
Constant 540.46*** 0.10 8.49***
(147.77) (0.22) (2.05)
Observations 148 171 171
R
2 0.24 0.42 0.22
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
and seed-cotton growing farmers strongly predicts cotton productivity with co-
ecients some 2.5 times the size of the redistribution eect. These high quality
farmers may thus also be providing some localized spillover eects, mirroring
the spillovers produced by commercial farmers. In order to test this, the base-
line specication is augmented in Table 21 by adding goldclass, larger-scale44
and seed-growing communal cotton farmers to indigenous commercial farmers
(column (1)), as well as each group separately (columns (2), (3) and (4) respec-
tively), in setting up the dierence-in-dierence analysis. This augmentation
tests whether unobserved characteristics shared by large and/or highly produc-
tive communal farmers explains localised productivity spillovers to communal
farmers. If this is conrmed, high quality and/or larger farmers located rela-
tively far away from commercial land, may provide social-learning eects in the
absence of commercial farmers.
Table 21 indicates that this mechanism is not contributing to the results seen
in the primary analysis in Table 11. Proximity to high quality farmers (column
(2)) is not consistent with the network spillovers identied in the primary speci-
44I.e. farmers with over 10 hectares under cotton. This is where communal land holdings,
including access to grazing, average 16 hectares across the country (Chavunduka 1982, p.64).
45cation. These results imply that characteristics, specic to commercial farmers
are important for the eects found in Table 11. For example, access to signicant
credit, facilitating investment in human and physical capital, may be important
here. This access is predicated on the ownership structure of agricultural land.
Table 21: Robustness: Goldclass, Large Farmers and Seed-Cotton Growing
Farmers
Yield per ha (1) (2) (3) (4)
Distance, km 0.10 0.91* 0.48* 4.20
(0.28) (0.48) (0.25) (4.02)
Redistribution, (D) -2.39 -0.27 -1.52 35.04
(3.96) (4.21) (4.11) (27.71)
D*R 0.02 -0.82 -0.37 -4.03
(0.28) (0.51) (0.26) (4.05)
Fert, kg 0.59*** 0.58*** 0.65*** 0.66***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Seed, kg 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.27*** 0.26**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.12)
Altitude, m 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Soil quality (1-7) -9.69** -9.32** -9.69** -11.77**
(3.80) (4.08) (3.96) (5.33)
Road, km 1.60*** 1.41*** 1.28*** 1.79***
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24) (0.34)
Gins, km -0.25*** -0.28*** -0.34*** -0.36***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
Trained farmer, km -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.07
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13)
Seed grower, (D) 115.42*** 134.53***
(10.78) (11.38)
Goldclass, (D) 102.26*** 92.14***
(5.72) (7.90)
Large farmer, (D) -162.85*** -149.52***
(21.12) (19.22)
Year, (D) -51.08*** -49.88*** -49.10*** -49.15***
(2.22) (2.26) (2.26) (3.08)
Region, (D) 50.45*** 46.93*** 47.89*** 51.30***
(3.55) (3.66) (3.45) (4.78)
Constant 215.70*** 220.38*** 219.95*** 178.46***
(7.98) (8.25) (7.94) (29.03)
Observations 51,720 51,831 56,654 28,207
R
2 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.05
Specication Goldclass, Large Seed
Large & Goldclass Farmers Growers
Seed Growers
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
46It can be noted that the R2 statistics are low (less than 0.1) for the fol-
lowing specications: Tables 10, 11 and two of the robustness checks (Tables
15 and 21). This indicates that important explanatory variables have not been
controlled for in these specications. If these are correlated with the indepen-
dent variables this may be of concern. However, for the specications utilising
data from the detailed sub-group and alternate (survey) dependent variables,
the value of R2 increases to 0.24 and 0.59 respectively. These specications are
altered only slightly from the primary specication and the sign and signicance
on the coecients of interest are preserved with the larger value of R2. This
indicates the the omitted variables may well be artefacts that are not strongly
correlated with the independent variables included in the regressions here. Fur-
ther information on the farmer's characteristics and more detailed information
regarding the ecology of the farmland itself may be useful here (Neba et al.
2010).
Overall the estimated results described here provide clear identication of
the network eects of interest between commercial and communal farmers and
validity for the primary identication strategy. Furthermore the richness of the
available secondary data describing alternate outcome variables as well as a de-
tailed description of the overall structure of cotton production in the country
strengthen the primary results and allow identication of some of the mecha-
nisms through which these network eects may be operating. The estimation
results, both linear and non-linear, show that communal farmers proximate to
redistributed land have suered signicantly as a result of the dismantling of
positive agricultural network eects that operate primarily between very large
commercial farmers and small-scale communal farmers. On the other hand, as-
sistance in timely transportation of agricultural inputs, as well as cotton training
schemes may replace some of these positive spillovers for the communal cotton
growing community in Zimbabwe.
A concern is that the identication of potential network eects may be con-
founded by omitted variables bias. Where network eects have been substituted
for alternate coping strategies in control areas, the observed eects would like-
wise be confounded. This may result in a reduced `distance eect'. This would
bias the paper's overall results downwards from the true eect under experi-
47mental conditions.
Selection bias on types of commercial farmers may also be of concern. First,
dierences between indigenous and non-indigenous commercial farmers may
confound the identication power of the paper's results. Relatively little re-
search has been formally carried out between or indeed within these groups. To
the extent that both are located in similar geographic areas with similar access
to private sector credit there is little to suggest that indigenous farmers dier
signicantly from their non-indigenous counterparts. Dierences across observ-
able characteristics are tested across these groups, and controlled for where
found (see Table 2).
Further, those communal farmers located close to non-indigenous, redis-
tributed land may have been aected dierentially by the land reform process
itself. If these farmers received more land,45 their per-hectare productivity may
decline as nite resources are spread over increased plot sizes. Similarly, where
household labour is reduced as a result of redistribution, cotton productivity,
which is particularly reliant on household labour may be negatively aected.
Testing for relative hectarage shows no dierence between farmers close to re-
distributed land and those further away (see Table 4). A proxy for farm size
(seed usage) controls for the potential negative eect of increased farm size on
productivity (see Table 5).
6 Conclusion
This paper combines farm-level, geographic and survey data with information
on land ownership structures both before and after recent land redistribution
policies implemented in the country. The paper is specically concerned with
communal farmers who have not (as yet) beneted from recent land redistribu-
tion policies in Zimbabwe. The data is analysed to assess whether and to what
extent communal farmer location, with respect to large scale commercial farms,
aects cotton productivity, income, consumption or expenditure outcomes, as a
result of social learning externalities and/or network eects between these two
45Either as a direct result of the redistribution, where the household's land holdings increase,
or as an indirect result, where beneciaries in the associated village receive land thus resulting
in more land available for the remaining village households.
48groups of farmers.
I nd a negative eect on cotton productivity and some survey outcome
variables for cotton farmers located close to recently redistributed commercial
farms, when controlling for farm-level environmental characteristics as well as
input use. This applies both when compared to those farmers near commercial
land that has not been redistributed as well as those farmers located away from
any commercial land. This supports the paper's main hypothesis, namely that
communal farmers benet from localised network eects, based on proximity
to large-scale commercially farmed land. Removal of these network eects has
resulted in negative agricultural outcomes for proximate cotton farmers that
could be identied over and above the wider-spread negative eects of the re-
distribution policy coinciding with generalised economic, political and social
decline.
The paper carries out several robustness tests both to control for selection
bias and to attempt to uncover mechanisms by which the network eects of
interest may operate. Examination of an NGO-led cotton training programme
provides evidence for the existence of social learning amongst cotton growers.
The dierence-in-dierence results for income, consumption and expenditure
outcomes indicate the importance of these network eects for a wider set of
social and economic outcomes as well as explicitly accounting for the dierence
in outcome before and after the redistribution. This secondary dierence-in-
dierence identication strategy goes some way to ruling out the possibility
that selection bias on commercial farm types is driving the results. Subsequent
specications indicate that network eects are correlated with land ownership
structures and farm size rather than simply with relative productivity of larger-
scale farmers. Where land ownership structures predicate ability to leverage
land in order to access private credit markets, this may be driving the results,
rather than unobservables on commercial farmers potentially correlated with
ethnicity. Lastly, examination of a detailed sub-sample of cotton farmers in-
dicates that transportation of inputs for under-resourced farmers may be one
channel through which the network eects identied may operate.
These revealed network eects mechanisms suggest that the network eects
of interest may be replaced, over time, by existing communal farmer networks
49in the country.
The results have policy implications for land redistribution policies both
within Zimbabwe and more broadly. The rich empirical analysis as well as anec-
dotal evidence suggest that access to machinery, skills and pesticide spillovers
provided by commercial farmers (directly or indirectly) and otherwise unavail-
able to communal farming communities, is important. This adds to existing
work on land reform in Zimbabwe, for example, Kinsey (2004) where the eects
of land redistribution on the outcomes of resettled farmers are investigated.
Further, this paper addresses an area that has received little attention in the
literature, namely the eect of land redistribution on those farmers who do
not benet directly through land allocation. Here I focus on those communal
farmers yet to benet from the recent land redistribution in the country.
Whilst it is acknowledged that addressing historic land ownership imbal-
ances is of importance for sustained and equitable post-colonial development,
the paper's results argue that an extensive knowledge of both formal and infor-
mal agricultural support structures is essential before engaging in wide-spread
land reform. This is in order to avoid costly removal of support structures essen-
tial to the sustainability of the sector post reform. This is especially important
where agriculture accounts for a large proportion of national output, as well as
income and food security for large segments of society.
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53A Cotton in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe is widely regarded as the \star performer amongst liberalized cotton
sectors" (Poulton et al. 2004, p.527) with high small holder yields and cotton
quality. Cottco is recognised as giving good producer prices which may stimulate
the higher yields and returns it realises when compared to other African coun-
tries. Quton, the country's seed-cotton supplier, is also applauded for its high
quality research and development strategy. Poulton et al. (2004) also highlights
some of the recent issues aecting the country's cotton including productivity,
service delivery, relationships with producers and quality control as the market
adjusts to a large number of new entrants since 2000.
B Background: Important Ocial Documents
Four ocial documents, three from the Government of Zimbabwe and one from
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), inform much of the pub-
lished background material documenting the progress of the reforms carried out
in the country since independence in 1980. Chavunduka (1982) recognises the
unsustainability of the land-ownership system the country inherited from previ-
ous regimes, specically the falling productivity and rising population densities
in communal farming areas. This report highlights the lack of capital forma-
tion under the communal ownership system and the diculties that communal
farmers have in accessing credit facilities. The report also indicates that com-
mercial farmers recognised the need for orderly redistribution and that they were
engaged in discussing the nancing and execution of such a system46 Rukuni
(1994) focuses on appropriate land tenure systems noting early on that ecient
land use depends on access to capital, education, agricultural services, infras-
tructure as well as land tenure. This report also describes the historic allocation
of land between black and white farmers in the country prior to independence.
Finally Utete (2003) examines the initial years of the FTLR programme. Sev-
eral ongoing issues aecting the FTLR are noted, including relatively low take
up of allocated land, lack of agricultural inputs hampering those farmers who
have taken up allocated land but are unable to realize its full potential, the
need for increased infrastructure as well as the chaotic and opaque nature of the
allocation process itself. Last Dore, Hawkins, Kanyenze, Makina, Ndlela and
Simpson (2008) examines some of policies required to begin sustainable recovery
in the country, given the catastrophic economic and social decline since the late
1990s.
C Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe achieved majority rule in 1980 after declaring independence from
Britain in 1965. The 1980s saw a continuation of many of the control econ-
omy arrangements initiated before 1980 as well as implementation of signicant
redistributive objectives, including land reform programmes. These saw im-
provements in social indicators, for example education attainment and primary
health care outcomes, albeit at the cost of large budget decits. Initial redis-
tributive policies likewise contributed to increased domestic demand. However,
low export growth as well as weak capital formation, scarcity of foreign exchange
and on-going scal imbalances ultimately led to a wide-spread acceptance of
economic restructuring, (Dore et al. 2008).
Resulting reforms, led by the World Bank and IMF, in the rst half of the
1990s included trade liberalisation, which saw many inecient, local manu-
facturing concerns whither, with few attaining international export status, in-
cluding many involved in cotton processing (for example textile manufacturing).
46The report also discusses the constitutional limits placed on the government's policies to
eect signicant land reform, as laid out in the Lancaster House agreement.
54Thus agriculture remained important for export earnings, employment and rural
poverty reduction. This despite a failure to address fundamental weaknesses in
the structure of the agricultural sector resulting from historic racial imbalances
which contributed to low productivity gains for the communal sector.
Further, failure to accept the scal logic required by a sustained opening of
the economy in the early 1990s reversed many of the gains from the previous
decade, as in
ation accelerated and growth stalled. This along side a failure
to create jobs for the growing, and increasingly educated, work force led to
heightened political and economic pressure towards the end of the decade. Fi-
nally, \government policy became increasingly interventionist as the authorities
sought to reverse [the] economic decline" (Dore et al. 2008, p.10).
D Sample Selection
The sample of communal cotton farmers comprises all cotton farmers on Cottco's
les for three (Bindura, Glendale and Muzarabani) of the company's nine busi-
ness units. Cottco provides credit services to over 50% of the cotton farmers
in the country, although not specically representative the available sample re-
lates to a large porportion of existing cotton farmers. Selection bias between
Cottco and non-Cottco cotton farmers cannot be ruled out but are not thought
to signicantly aect the sample characteristics.
The sample is reduced to account for the availability of data on commer-
cial farm ownership structures. Thus farmers in western and north-western
Mashonaland Central have been excluded as well as several farmers in the south
east of the province. Additionally, those farmers close to (within 10km of) land
currently farmed by remaining non-indigenous commercial farmers have been
excluded from the sample as selection-bias on commercial farm ownership is
expected to be signicant. Signicantly farmers located on commercial land of
any sort are excluded - these redistributed farmers are expected to introduce
signicant selection bias as they are outside of the targeted identication strat-
egy of the paper. Last, the Cottco data contains many farmers for whom no
yield information is available, these farmers are excluded from the baseline anal-
ysis but are included in the robustness check carried out by substituting yield
information for household survey outcomes. The baseline analysis then com-
prises 30,531 observations from a possible 79,682 where 25,846 are excluded on
geographic criteria (proximity to uncategorised commercial farm land etc) while
23,305 are excluded initially due to lack of yield data, although these farmers
are subsequently re-introduced into the analysis.
E Additional Descriptive Statistics
Comparisons between communal cotton farmers remaining on their land and
those farmers who have beneted directly from the land redistribution can be
seen in Table E1. This is carried out across environmental, outcome, farm char-
acteristics and relative location of these groups of farmers from economic entities
of interest. Redistributed farmers achieve higher yields on similar hectarages
than the combined group of control and treated communal farmers.
Dierences between the `detailed sub-group' (200 farmers) and the full sam-
ple can be seen in Table E3. Here the sub-sample records higher output per
hectare and more conducive environmental conditions (altitude, rainfall and soil
quality) than the large sample. The sub-sample is also closer, on average, to
roads, gins and goldclass, and commercial land than the overall sample. Last
the sub-sample are more likely to be seed-cotton growers than the baseline sam-
ple, a predictor of farmer quality. This indicates that the sub-group is may
benet from easier access to gins, trained communal farmers and environmental
conditions but also that the group is more prone to experience violence as a
result of the redistribution implementation (proximity to roads).
55Table E1: Farm/er Characteristics: Non-Redistributed and Redistributed Com-
munal Farmers (Mean Dierence)
Non-Redistributed Redistributed Mean Di.
Outcome
Yield per ha, kg 258.40 321.26 -62.85***
(7.83)
Farm Characteristics
Ha 2.74 2.63 0.11
(0.24)
Seed, kg 21.64 15.49 6.15***
(0.41)
Fertilizer, kg 36.63 68.77 -32.14***
(1.46)
Environmental Characteristics
Altitude, m 713.63 1089.65 -376.13***
(8.39)
Rainfall (annual average), mm 770.90 853.70 -82.79***
(1.82)
Soil quality (1-7) 1.10 1.16 0.66
(0.96)
Proximity
Roads, km 3.70 2.78 0.92***
(0.12)
Gins, km 49.55 24.44 25.10***
(0.97)
Trained farmer, km 20.00 15.79 4.21***
(0.39)
Seed grower, % 3.04 34.11 -31.76***
(0.55)
Goldclass farmer, % 7.91 7.02 0.89
(0.78)
Large farmer, % 0.36 0.73 0.36**
(0.17)
Indigenous, km 31.02 5.21 25.80***
(0.62)
Non-Indigenous, km 25.07 0.23 24.83***
(0.48)
Observations 30,531 1,240
Source: Cottco (2009), Cotton Training Centre (2009), Quton (2009), Fischer et al. (2008),
Matsuura and Willmott (2009), Hijmans et al. (2005) & Farm Valuation Data (2010).
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
56Table E2: Proximity and Hectarage: Treated Farmers (Mean Dierences)
Indigenous Non-Indigenous
Mean No. of Obs. Mean No. of Obs. Mean Di.
Hectarage
Treated
1 2.25 6172 2.32 7781 -0.08
(0.12)
Distance
Treated 5.62 6172 5.55 7781 -0.07**
(0.04)
Source: Cottco (2009) & Farm Valuation Data (2010).
1 All cotton located less that 10km from any commercially farmed land.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table E3: Farm/er Characteristics: Detailed Sub-Group and Baseline Sample
(Mean Dierences)
Sub-sample Baseline sample Mean Di.
Outcome
Yield per ha, kg 455.38 258.40 196.97***
(21.58)
Environmental Characteristics
Altitude, m 862.11 713.63 148.47***
(22.65)
Rainfall (annual average), mm 835.74 770.90 64.83***
(4.81)
Soil quality (1-7) 1.02 1.10 0.75***
(0.24)
Proximity
Roads, km 2.54 3.70 -1.16***
(0.33)
Gins, km 24.37 49.55 -25.18***
(2.56)
Trained farmer, km 16.29 20.00 -3.71***
(1.48)
Seed grower, % 30.9 3.04 27.867***
(1.31)
Goldclass farmer, km 2.29 2.50 0.21
(0.38)
Large farmer, km 16.07 6.49 9.57***
(0.64)
Indigenous farmer, km 16.07 31.02 -14.95***
(1.64)
Non-Indigenous farmer, km 10.94 25.07 -14.12***
(1.27)
Observations 178 30531
Source: Cottco (2009), Cotton Training Centre (2009), Quton (2009), Fischer et al. (2008),
Matsuura and Willmott (2009), Hijmans et al. (2005) & Farm Valuation Data (2010).
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
57F Commercial Agriculture in Zimbabwe
In 1983 commercial farmers in Mashonaland had over 40,000 hectares under to-
bacco yielding 92,000 tons of tobacco, 204,000 hectares under maize (467,000t),
14,000 hectares under wheat (84,000t) and 40,000 hectares under soya beans
(71,000t), the four most important cash crops in the area by land usage (Central
Statistics Oce 1983). By the late 1990s the total tobacco and wheat outputs
in this area had doubled, whilst that of soya bean and maize had stayed roughly
constant over time (Commercial Famers' Union 2004). Commercially grown to-
bacco has a high pesticide requirements (Taylor 1984), this is likely to reduce
the local pest burden to the benet of other farmers in the area. This provides
one possible cause of the positive spillover eects found here.
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